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Abstract 
The standardization, interconnectivity and pervasiveness of information systems, combined with the 
increasing ability to collect and utilize data, enhance the value they offer a user. These strengths however 
can also be turned into a weakness and vulnerability by ransomware (RW). RW can utilize the functionality 
of current systems both to infect them but also to increase the magnitude of the attack. This research 
proposes a model of the impact of the RW attack on the user’s trust, which in turn has an effect on their 
decision to pay the ransom or follow the guidance from the relevant institutions. The model shows that the 
effectiveness of the attack, the trust in the competence of the attacker and ransomware demands that are 
reasonable and easy to fulfil, positively influence the intention to pay the ransom. The initial institutional 
response, institutional trust and institutional solution influence the intention to follow the institutional 
guidance. 
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Introduction 
On the fifth of May 2017 extensive ransomware (RW) attacks impacted many countries. Targets included 
public and private organizations around the world including hospitals, carmakers and train operators 
across Europe. Millions of users, customers and patients were impacted directly by the prolonged attack 
that harmed the victims in many ways. Most people around the world however had not visited a hospital, 
would not notice that their car took a few days longer to make, or bought a train ticket. Almost everyone 
however had turned on their computers and TVs and seen the RW message requesting a payment on their 
screen from news outlets and social media. It was not just these hundreds of organizations that were held 
ransom but also trust in the public and private institutions such as regulators, that had until then provided 
people with reliable digital services. If reputable organizations that have a strong bond with millions, like a 
carmaker and a train operator, can be compromised what else is vulnerable? Are the regulations, operating 
systems, online platforms and the internet infrastructure itself safe? 
RW is a growing problem with incidents increasing yearly since 2012. Some reports claim approximately 
two in five organizations have been targeted by RW attacks (Simmonds 2017).  The breadth of use and 
reliance on technology, and the inevitability of bugs in the software that create vulnerabilities, mean it is 
difficult to  be confident of avoiding such attacks (Orman 2016). The attack in May 2017 using WannaCry 
RW was considered technologically basic but this was soon followed by the more sophisticated Petya 
GoldenEye. There are many types of RW that can infect servers, specific PCs and mobile devices. Most of 
these ransoms require payment by Bitcoin. This digital currency and payment method, like RW, is not fully 
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controlled or regulated by institutions. This may further compound the erosion of trust in the control and 
influence of institutions. 
RW raises many technical issues on an organization’s software and hardware, as well as the national 
infrastructure. There is also an impact on an individual’s trust. Trust has been found to be an important 
prerequisite to transactions, particularly online (Pavlou 2003). RW has been explored primarily in the area 
of security, both in relation to the relevant information systems and the role of members of the organization 
in strengthening or weakening security (Mustaca 2014). The influence on the individuals outside of the 
infected organizations such as consumers, users, patients or other stakeholders has not been sufficiently 
explored. As the scale and severity of these attack grows the influence on the individual, particularly their 
trust becomes more important. The importance of trust emerges from uncertainty and its significance is 
elevated when the degree of uncertainty increases (Jarvenpaa et al. 1999). A RW attack increases 
uncertainty for many users, especially those directly affected. Given the national or global nature of these 
attacks trust in institutions is affected, not just trust in individual organizations. This research explores and 
evaluates the impact of extended global RW attacks, such as the case of the May 2017 attacks, on 
institutional trust and the intention to pay the ransom. The proposed model shows how the effectiveness of 
the attack, the trust in the competence of the attacker and the value of the RW solution influence the user’s 
intention to pay the ransom. On the other hand, the initial response of the institutions, institutional trust 
and the value of the solution offered, influences the user’s decision to follow the institutional solution. 
Theoretical Background 
The volume of data generated and utilized is expanding. So are the devices that generate and utilize these 
data. The benefits we receive and our dependence on these data increases in line with this expansion. This 
applies to both professional and personal lives as highlighted when hospitals are targeted. Therefore, while 
malicious attacks are not new, the impact on an individual’s trust is significant. The individual may already 
feel vulnerable due to other threats like privacy issues (Khokhar et al. 2016). From the perpetrator’s 
perspective, the scalability of the attacks means that more widely used systems, such as Google Android or 
Microsoft Windows 10, are more appealing targets (Mercaldo et al. 2016). This suggests large scale attacks, 
targeting large organizations globally, may continue to happen.  
Ransomware attack  
RW is a form of malware software that is designed to covertly collect data and financially extort the victim 
(Mercaldo et al. 2016). The attack can be initiated in a number of ways such as phishing emails, malicious 
downloaded programs, malicious embedded adverts that execute JavaScript, ‘watering-hole attack’ and 
‘web-drive by’ (Erridge 2016). The global RW attacks of WannaCry and Petya GoldenEye spread quickly by 
utilizing an exploit in an operating system, that allowed quick filesharing from one computer to another 
and bypassed the security of the new victim. This meant computers with no security vulnerabilities 
introduced by the user, updated security and antivirus, could be infected. The technology that makes this 
crime possible includes the cryptography that makes the victims data inaccessible. It may block access to 
data or all the system’s functionalities until a ransom is paid. Some sophisticated RW attacks target the 
most critical systems and data. Furthermore, data can be stolen including pictures and actions can be taken 
such as taking photos with the device’s camera. The specific technologies used are evolving with more 
sophisticated and elaborate attacks emerging. The attack in May 2017 using WannaCry RW was basic but 
this was followed by the more sophisticated Petya GoldenEye. While Wannacry encrypted some data and 
had a kill switch, Goldenye encrypted the whole disc, deleted the event logs and did not have a universal kill 
switch. The damage caused is significant with one fifth of victims completely stopping their operations for 
a period (Simmonds 2017). Other intentions may be concealed under an apparently typical RW such as 
stealing data, installing spyware or installing dormant malware for use in future attacks. 
Ransomware response 
A global RW attack such as the one the May 2017 can be described as a disaster with far reaching 
consequences. A solution may take weeks and may not be comprehensive. Therefore, the initial response 
from the institutions is both distinct from the solution and important. Furthermore, in many disasters the 
response can have an influence on the victim comparable to the disaster itself. The victim is under pressure 
(Wecksten et al. 2016) and may respond extremely positively to helpful support and extremely negatively 
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to what is perceived as unhelpful. The institutions are part of an ‘ecosystem’ that supports secure e-
commerce. They support an organization’s information systems such as the operating system, the 
enterprise system, the antivirus software, the local network and the international network. The public and 
private institutions that are responsible for oversight and support the normal situation, are also part of this 
‘ecosystem’. The success of maintaining situational normality, depends on this collaboration being 
coordinated. Effective collaboration is often critical in disaster management (Simon et al. 2009). The 
solution emerges from a forensic investigation of the attack (Orman 2016). The victim must inform the 
relevant institutions and not keep the attack secret and pay the ransom. Therefore, there is a necessary 
collaboration between the victim and the institutions in developing and implementing the solution. As trust 
is important in most forms of collaboration, it is central to responding to the attacks successfully.  
The effect of extended, global ransomware attacks on institutional trust 
While the attack uses a software virus to hold an organization’s software ‘hostage’, this is not just about 
information systems. The people involved are an equally important part of the puzzle, as the attacker’s 
success ultimately depends on intimidation (Simmonds 2017). The perception of the threat can be more 
significant than the factual threat. Here, we focus on the victim’s perspective not the system perspective. 
In the area of e-commerce one useful explanation of trust is that it is the willingness to depend, based on a 
belief in the reliability and benevolence (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). One important point this definition 
makes, is that trust depends both on the perceived intention but also the ability to deliver what is agreed 
on. Initial research into trust centered on technology adoption (McKnight et al. 2002) while more recent 
research also evaluated trust in post adoption scenarios (Thatcher et al. 2011). For the case of the influence 
of RW attacks, the models on postadoption are more suitable, as this attack impacts existing users and 
consumers that have already trusted the institutions. 
Institutional trust is formed by situational normality and structural assurance (McKnight et al. 2002). 
These two components of institutional trust are dependent on the context of the relationship. For example, 
they are different when evaluating health intermediaries (Song and Zahedi 2007) or making a purchase 
with a digital currency like Bitcoin (Zarifis et al. 2014). Situational normality is formed by competence, 
benevolence, integrity and the more general situation. Structural assurance is the belief of the user or 
consumer, that the environment they are using, with various information systems, is safe. This covers 
processes, procedures, contracts, guarantees, promises and legal recourse (McKnight et al. 2002).  
Consumer trust was earned by organizations and the institutions that support them through the quality of 
the service and the level of security and privacy provided. Global RW attacks however, offer a challenge to 
this. This challenge may not be fully explained by the existing trust models that were primarily focused 
technology adoption or attitude towards technology. In some of these attacks, reputation harm may be the 
main motive and not financial gain (Erridge 2016). It is possible that in such attacks the ransom is there to 
conceal the real purpose.  
Research Model 
Trust has been defined as a belief in the competence, benevolence and integrity of an organization or an 
individual (Mayer et al. 1995). While the attacker would not be expected to create a belief in their 
benevolence and integrity with their action, the effectiveness of the attack may create a belief in their 
competence. The competence in information systems to implement the attack would indicate a competence 
in discontinuing the attack. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:  
H1: The effectiveness of the attack will increase the victim’s trust in the competence of the attacker.  
For the attacker to succeed in encrypting the victim’s files they need to overcome the security many 
institutions have in place. These institutions include the antivirus supplier, the operating systems provider, 
organizations related to the internet and other organization, public or private which may have identified 
vulnerabilities and then unintentionally revealed them. By succeeding in the attack, the trust in these 
institutions is reduced. Therefore, the second hypothesis states: 
H2: The trust in the competence of the attacker will decrease the victim’s trust in the institutions. 
The victim will need to trust the competence of the attacker so that they pay the ransom. The victim will 
need to believe that the attacker is in control and can discontinue the attack when the payment is made. 
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The victim must also believe the decryption keys will be given and that the encryption can be reversed. If 
the victim concludes that there is nobody in control of this attack and it is an uncontrolled, self-propagating, 
virus they may not want to transact. Therefore, the third hypothesis states: 
H3: The trust in the competence of the attacker will increase the victim’s intention to pay the ransom. 
The RW attack is experienced by the victim while the solution offered to them, if they pay the ransom, has 
not been experienced before the decision to pay or not is made. The belief of the victim in relation to the 
attack is based on an experience, while the belief of the solution offered by the attacker is based on their 
expectation of an outcome. Therefore, while the RW attack and the offer to discontinue the attack both 
come from the attacker they are two separate constructs. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis states: 
H4: The perceived effectiveness of paying the ransom will have a negative effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of the institutional solution. 
The nature of the ransom itself influences the decision to pay it. The amount, the currency and payment 
method are considered when making a decision. The payment process of the ransom can include elements 
of technology adoption due to its nature. A high amount and payment in a currency that is relatively difficult 
to acquire and make a payment like Bitcoin, may have a negative influence on the decision to pay. There 
has been anecdotal evidence of organizations struggling to find a sufficient number of Bitcoins to make a 
ransom payment. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis states: 
H5: The perceived effectiveness of paying the ransom will have a positive influence on paying the ransom. 
The way the victim’s trust in the institutions is influenced by the RW attack can be a mirror image of the 
victim’s trust in the attacker. As illustrated in figure one, certain actions shape trust and ultimately influence 
the decision to pay the ransom or follow the institutions guidance. The initial response of the institutions 
after the RW attack will influence the trust of the victim in the institutions. A positive response would 
include elements of disaster management. This response can be organized, coordinated and reassuring, 
increasing trust (Aliakbarlou et al. 2017). It can be useful to the victim even if it stops short of providing a 
comprehensive solution. A positive response can offer clear information; this information can come from 
the institutions first, before it is released by another source like a blogger and there can be no information 
withheld. Alternatively, it can be chaotic. For example, one institution may blame the software provider for 
not offering the necessary support and the software provider may blame the organization for using outdates 
systems. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis states: 
H6: The perceived effectiveness of the initial institutional response to the RW attack will increase the 
victims trust in the institutions. 
A higher level of institutional trust will make the victim follow the guidance offered because a positive 
outcome will appear more likely. The trust in the institution relevant here covers competence, benevolence 
and integrity. This is unlike the trust in the attacker which is limited to trust in their competence. Institution 
based trust is formed by situational normality and structural assurance. Situational normality suggests a 
positive outcome because of an ordered, normal and positive Internet environment (McKnight et al. 2002). 
Structural assurance refers to safeguards such as guarantees, regulations and legal remedy intended to 
support a positive outcome. It has been validated that institutional trust strengthens trusting beliefs which 
in turn reinforce trust related behaviors (McKnight et al. 2002). As the attacker and institutions have 
opposing objectives, an increase in the trust in the former reduces trust in the latter: 
H7: The institutional trust will increase the victim’s intention to follow institutional guidance. 
H8: The institutional trust will decrease the victim’s trust in the competence of the attacker. 
The victim will evaluate the effectiveness of the solution offered by the institutions. A solution that emerged 
from outside the institutions, like a security expert, but was endorsed by the institutions is considered as 
the institutional solution here. The effectiveness will be evaluated in terms of whether it reinstates access 
to the systems and data, is easy to implement and the financial cost is low. The impression of how long the 
initiative was lost, is also a factor. As the attacker’s ransom and institutions’ guidance are opposing solutions 
an increase in the trust in the former may reduce trust in the latter:  
H9: The perceived effectiveness of the institutional solution to the RW attack will increase the victim’s 
intention to follow institutional guidance. 
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H10: The perceived effectiveness of the institutional solution to the RW attack will decrease the victim’s 
perceived effectiveness of adopting the ransom solution. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed model of the victim’s decision to pay the ransom or follow institutional 
guidance 
Methodology 
The epistemological approach was critical realist as there was the event of the RW attack but there were 
also the victims’ beliefs on this event. Given that some aspects of this topic such as how these attacks happen 
are well understood but other aspects like the impact of global RW attacks are less understood, empirically 
validating the model was necessary. 
A survey was used to evaluate the users’ beliefs on the ten hypotheses. Existing scales from the areas of 
trust, information security, and attitudes towards IS were used where possible (McKnight et al. 2002; 
Polites and Karahanna 2012; Venkatesh et al. 2003). For each item, a seven-point Likert scale was utilized 
ranging from strongly disagree (1), to strongly agree (7). There were eight latent variables in total. For six 
of the latent variables there were four items. For the two latent variables to pay the ransom or follow the 
guidance three items were used. Three items are considered sufficient for the variable or variables that are 
the conclusion of a path model (Polites and Karahanna 2012; Venkatesh et al. 2003). Twelve interviews 
were carried out to evaluate the survey questions in terms of how understandable they were and whether 
they covered the issues intended. The participants had been victims of RW attacks.  
For this model the popular method of estimating the minimum sample size by multiplying the items by ten 
(Chin and Newsted 1999) would suggest a sample size of 380. The survey was disseminated online to a 
general sample with 448 respondents. Participants were required to confirm that they had been affected in 
some way by the RW attacks before they were allowed to access the survey. Participants were asked about 
their knowledge of the attacks and how the attacks and the response, influenced their beliefs on trust. From 
these responses 407 were considered complete and valid.  
Due to the complex model and need to evaluate latent variables through formative indicator variables the 
Structural Equation Method (SEM) was used. Covariance based SEM was applied with IBM AMOS 25. 
Covariance based SEM was selected over Partial Least Squares SEM because this research is primarily 
confirmatory while allowing exploration of emerging relationships (Hair et al. 2014). Both the 
measurement model and the structural model were evaluated with the Maximum Likelihood method. The 
measurement model expresses the relationship between the manifest variables and the latent variables 
while the structural model expresses the relationship between the latent variables. 
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Results 
The quantitative analysis consisted of a survey to validate the model developed from the literature and 
refined with the qualitative analysis. The demographic analysis presented in table 1 did not reveal any 
significant results but it supports that the sample was suitably diverse. Many SEM analysis techniques were 
applied, and the main findings are presented here.  
Demographic profile Frequency Percentage 
Gender   
  Male 178 43.7 
  Female 226 56.3 
Age   
  <18 0 0.0 
  18-30 208 51.1 
  31-40 151 37.1 
  >40 48 11.8 
Table 1. Profile of the respondents 
Measurement model 
Several criteria were used to evaluate the formative measurement model. The analysis of the measurement 
model is presented in table 2 in terms of variance, standardized regression weight, standard error, critical 
ratio, probability level and mean. The standardized regression weights support the effect of the items on 
the latent variable. The low standard errors indicate a low spread and that the sample mean is close to the 
population mean. The critical ratios were above 1.96 and therefore indicated a significant covariance (Hox 
and Bechger 2009). The statistical significance (P) of all the indicators (p<0.01) suggests that the 
measurement model fit can be considered acceptable (Hair et al. 2014). Lastly the item mean indicates that 
participants on average agreed with the importance of the issues identified in these items. Overall, the 
results support the measurement model. 
Scale/Item Variance S.R.W. S.E. C.R. P Mean 
Ransomware attack 2.242  .225 9.975 *** 4.03 
  RA01  .832 .029  ***  
  RA02  .823 .027  ***  
  RA03  .847 .053  ***  
  RA04  .828 .040  ***  
Trust in attacker 
(competence, not benevolence) 
2.423  .238 10.171 *** 3.58 
  TA01  .841 .048  ***  
  TA02  .821 .041  ***  
  TA03  .828 .049  ***  
  TA04  .804 .043  ***  
Table 2a. Measurement model measures and results 
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Scale/Item Variance S.R.W. S.E. C.R P Mean 
Ransom solution 1.817  .198 9.179 *** 3.22 
  RS01  .821 .043  ***  
  RS02  .803 .038  ***  
  RS03  .834 .055  ***  
  RS04  .820 .052  ***  
Pay ransom 2.144  .221 9.704 *** 3.72 
  PR01  .826 .016  ***  
  PR02  .816 .015  ***  
  PR03  .876 .035  ***  
Ransomware institutional response 1.292  .157 8.227 *** 3.57 
  IR01  .751 .049  ***  
  IR02  .689 .034  ***  
  IR03  .756 .073  ***  
  IR04  .725 .067  ***  
Institutional trust 1.343  .161 8.329 *** 3.51 
  IT01  .757 .068  ***  
  IT02  .742 .062  ***  
  IT03  .739 .070  ***  
  IT04  .698 .054  ***  
Institutional solution 1.109  .144 7.708 *** 3.50 
  IS01  .725 .070  ***  
  IS02  .676 .061  ***  
  IS03  .729 .081  ***  
  IS04  .663 .061  ***  
Follow institutional guidance 1.293  .161 8.025 *** 3.84 
  IG01  .751 .021  ***  
  IG02  .743 .020  ***  
  IG03  .846 .054  ***  
***p < 0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
Table 2b. Measurement model measures and results 
Structural model 
Three of the hypotheses, hypothesis 4, the effect of RS on IS, hypothesis 7, the effect of IT on TA and 
hypothesis 10, IS on IG were not supported. For hypothesis 4, the effect of RS on IS, the results were 
S.R.W=0.009, and P=0.516. For hypothesis 7, the effect of IT on TA, the results were S.R.W=0.086, and 
P=0.323. For hypothesis 10, the effect of IS on IG the results were S.R.W=0.076, and P=0.348. This also 
led to the original proposed model having an insufficient fit with the data. 
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The model was further explored by removing these rejected hypothesized effects. Such modifications to a 
model on empirical grounds are a suitable approach when applying SEM methods (Raykov and Marcoulides 
2006; Schumacker and Lomax 2010). The model with the remaining seven relationships was supported by 
the data. The model supported empirically can also be supported theoretically as all the latent variables 
were retained and the most important relationships were also retained. The main results of the model are 
presented in table 3 in terms of standardized regression weight, standard error, critical ratio and probability 
level. The sample covariance and implied covariance, as indicated by the chi-square value suggest an 
acceptable fit for the model. The relative/normed chi-square (χ2/df) was at 4.8 which is below the 
acceptable ratio of 5.0 (Hooper et al. 2008; Wheaton et al. 1977). A complementary measure of model fit, 
the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)=0.077, is also acceptable for this model with these 
degrees of freedom and this number of participants (Hair et al. 2014). The other measures such as the 
statistical significance of all the indicators (p<0.1), also suggest the model fit can be considered acceptable 
(Hair et al. 2014). 
Hypothesized parameter Standardized 
Regression 
Weight 
S.E. C.R. P 
RA→ TA .918 .037 31.969 *** 
TA→IT .102 .011 3.649 * 
TA→PR .691 .024 17.240 *** 
RS→PR .723 .031 16.639 *** 
IR→IT .898 .041 28.211 *** 
IT→IG .658 .031 14.004 *** 
IS→IG .753 .037 15.158 *** 
Model fit: df= 375, χ2/df =4.8, CFI = .929, RMSEA= .0.77; ***p < 0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
Table 3. Structural model measures and results 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Validated model of the victim’s decision to pay the ransom or follow institutional 
guidance 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The first target of the RW attacks are the organizations that are held at ransom. Drawing from the literature, 
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regulators. In both cases, one dimension of the damage caused is the loss of trust from the users, consumers 
and patients. This loss of trust influences the decision whether to pay the ransom. If the ransom is paid, this 
may encourage further RW attacks and create a negative feedback loop of falling trust and a positive 
feedback loop of increased incentive to make these attacks. It is therefore useful to extend our 
understanding of the relationship between RW attacks and trust. 
Firstly, this research validates the role of trust in the user’s, consumer’s or patient’s decision to pay the 
ransom or follow the alternative solution offered by the institutions, such as the technology vendors and 
regulators. Secondly, some factors that influence the intention to pay the ransom were identified. It was 
shown, that trust in the competence of the attacker influences the intention to pay. The ransom proposed 
by the attacker should not be seen just as an amount of money. Given that the process of paying the ransom 
includes the payment method, which is new to most victims, the ransom should be seen as a new technology 
that must be adopted. Thirdly, some factors that influence the intention to follow the solution offered by 
the institutions were identified. These included the value offered by the initial response and the institutional 
trust. The solution proposed should also be seen as a technology being adopted because of its novelty to the 
user. Fourthly, the interrelationship between the trust in the attacker and the trust in the institutions was 
proven although this relationship is more limited than what was initially hypothesized. The trust in the 
attacker’s competence has a negative effect on the institutional trust, although this had the weakest effect 
of all the relationships in the model.  
The limitations of this research are that the sample required the participants to have had direct experience 
of the RW attacks. While the attacks were broad and did not target a specific demographic, this may have 
biased the sample in a way that was not predicted.   
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